The developments following the 12-day war between Iran and Israel did not lead to de-escalation, but rather to a redefinition of the conflict on a much broader scale. While volatile negotiations between Tehran and Washington continued, the gap between the two sides’ expectations deepened. Ultimately, this gap led to a decision at the White House based on an optimistic assessment: To enter a limited conflict and force Iran into a rapid retreat.
But the battlefield quickly shattered that assumption. The war that was meant to be short, controlled, and manageable turned into a 40-day war of attrition, one that not only failed to achieve the initial objectives of the United States but imposed heavy military, economic, and political costs. Washington assumed Iran’s behavioural pattern from the short war with Israel would repeat, but this time the level of direct US involvement was far higher. Iran adjusted its response accordingly, most notably by playing the Strait of Hormuz card.
The US still assumed Iran’s main target would be Israel, but this time Tehran focused on US bases across the region. The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Jordan were placed directly on Iran’s target list. Iran’s gradual advances in missile technology, operational precision and air defence systems were not sufficiently accounted for in Washington’s calculations. The US did not believe Iran’s air defences could down its fighter jets or that Iranian missiles could disable the advanced radars at Gulf Arab states’ bases.
Command disagreements grew increasingly severe. The widespread dismissal of senior generals – including the army chief of staff and several other commanders – in the middle of the war was like a major earthquake at the Pentagon. This was no simple administrative reshuffle; it reflected a deadlock in modern military doctrine, which negatively impacted operational continuity.
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